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This paper develops a model of regional production networks based on localization
economies. I consider an industry with two activities: one with location-specific external
economies, the other with constant returns. Under autarky, localization economies imply the
formation of an industry center. Agglomeration drives up wages in the center, causing the
constant returns activity to disperse to outlying regions. Trade recreates the regional production
network on a global scale. I apply the model to data from the Mexican apparel industry.
Estimation results on Mexico's pre- and post-trade regional apparel wage structure are consistent







The past decade has witnessed an unprecedented move towards free trade in the
developing world. As expected, trade has led to a sectoral reallocation of reurces towards
labor-intensive activities (Michaely, Papageorgious, and Choksi 1991). Somewhat less expected,
trade has also led to a vertical reorganization of production: labor-intensive industries, such as
apparel, footwear, and electronics, are shifting from vertically-integrated production for the
domestic market to the specialized task of product assembly for foreign firms (Grunwald and
Flaxnm 1985). In this arrangement, which I term a regional production network, developed-
country firms supply product designs, process technology, and marketing services and subcontract
assembly services to branch plants in developing countries. Regional production networks
account for a large portion of developing-country trade. In Mexico, for instance, assembly plants
accounted for 40 percent of 1992 total exports and 53 percent of 1992 manufacturing exports.
In this paper, I develop a model of regional production networks and apply it to a study
of the Mexican apparel industry. The distinguishing feature of an regional production network
is that the services developed-country firms provide —design,engineering, and marketing —are
skill-intensive. The model is based on the idea there are external economies in these activities
which account for the observed pattern of industry location. Consider a small country (where
size proxies for development) with an industry that has two production stages: design, which has
location-specific external economies, and assembly, which has constant returns to scale.
Localization economies arise endogenously from the fact design involves many specialized
subsidiary services, each produced under increasing returns to scale. By agglomerating in an
industry center, firms share design capacity and expand the range of services available to them.
1Agglomeration, however, drives up wages in the industry center, pushing assembly into outlying
regions. Now suppose the small country opens to trade with a large country. Trade recreates
the regional production network on a global scale: the large country, by virtue of its size,
captures the industry center the small country, given low relative wages, specializes in assembly.
The model extends the vertical-production framework in Rivera-Bath (1988) and Krugman
and Venables (1993) to one in which labor is mobile regionally and internationally. Regional
production networks resemble multinational enterprises in that trade may take the form of
intraflnn transactions (Helpman and Krugman 1985 and Markusen and Rutherford 1993).
Regional production networks, however, are not restricted to intrafirm trade. Indeed, the semi-
durable good industries in which regional production networks predominate contain many firms
and involve substantial interfirm trade. The tension between agglomeration and congestion costs
draws on models of city formation due to increasing returns (Fujita 1988 and Krugman 1991).
Mexico provides a unique opportunity to study the effects of trade on industry location.
In 1985, Mexico decided to join the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATfl, bringing
a sudden end to four decades of import-substitution industrialization. For Mexico, the proximity
and size of the U.S. economy makes trade liberalization tantamount to economic integration with
its northern neighbor. The recent passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) only formalizes a de facto process of integration already under way.
What makes apparel an interesting case is the variation in reurce intensity across
production stages. Some activities, such as design and finishing, are specialized tasks that require
skilled labor. In the global apparel industry, specialized input suppliers are agglomerated in a
few locations, such as New York, Los Angeles, and Hong Kong. (The simple fact New York
2City remains a major apparel producer is perhaps the most persuasive evidence one can find of
localization economies.) Assembly, the other major production task, requires relatively few skills.
Firms in global apparel centers subcontract assembly to firms in low-wage regions.
The data are consistent with the hypothesis of localization economies. Under the closed
economy, high-skill apparel tasks clustered in Mexico City, while assembly took place in outlying
regions. With the opening to trade, Mexican apparel producers are shifting from production for
the domestic market to product assembly for U.S. firms. Econometric estimation of Mexico's pie
and post-trade regional wage structure supports the theoretical results. This suggests NAFI'A will
not only shift apparel assembly jobs from the United States to Mexico, as many studies have
predicted, but also lead to a substantial relocation of production within Mexico, reducing wages
in Mexico City relative to those along the Mexico-U.S. border.
The body of the paper contains three sections. Section two develops a model of a
regional production network. Section three presents data on the location and organization of the
Mexican apparel industry. Section four presents empirical results. A final section concludes.
IL Theory
A. The Model
Consider two countries, Foreign, which has a single region and represents the United
States, and Home, which has two regions, North and South, and represents Mexico. Each country
has landowners, who own one unit of land, and workers, who own one unit of labor. Foreign
has L workers and X landlords; Home has L workers and X landlords. I assume C ￿ L and X'
￿ X. Labor is mobile across regions and may be mobile across countries; land is completely
3immobile. Endowments are supplied inelastically; landowners receive rental income and workers
receive wage income. Tastes and technology are identical in each country. There are two
consumption goods, housing, X, and apparel, Y. Each country spends a share a of its income
on housing and a share 1-ct on apparel, as would arise with identical Cobb-Douglas preferences.
I use apparel production to motivate the model, but the basic technology —aproduction
process that has both specialized high-skill tasks and routine low-skill tasks --isgeneral to many
semi-durable consumer goods. High-skill activities occur in the initial and final stages of apparel
production. Before making a garment, a firm must create a design and turn the design into a
workable pattern. The finishing stage includes detail activities such as pleating, beitmaking, and
embroidering. I capture skill intensity by assuming design and finishing services have increasing
returns to scaie. The intermediate stage of apparel production is product assembly, in which
workers sew together cut pieces of fabric. Unlike design and finishing, assembly is a basic
activity that requires few skills. It accounts for three-fourths of apparel employment.
Production of apparel, Y, is given by
(1) r —VsZ1-I
Z is an intermediate input that represents assembly, for which production is given by
(2)Z•
whereL, is labor used in Z. V is an aggregate of many differentiated producer services,
,
(3) W—(s1)
s,isoutput of service 1, N is the number of services provided (both of which are endogenous),
4and a measures the substitutability of services in production (as a goes to I services become
perfect substitutes). Each service is produced under an identical increasing-returns technology
(4) L •a + b31
where L, is labor used in producing service S. The symmetry of producer services implies
(5) — —
which,following Rivera-Batiz (1988), allows me to rewrite (1) as
(6) Y— (N)Z'
Equation (6) shows the source of external economies: output of Y is increasing in N. As more
services become available, the production process becomes smoother and final-good output
increases, holding constant total service output.
A crucial assumption is that Z is traded across regions but services are not. What makes
services non-traded is that relative to transport costs the value added of an individual service is
smafl. The same is not true for assembly, which makes it feasible to subcontract the activity to
distant locations. To produce Y a firm needs to be in a region where S production occurs. With
increasing returns, not all services can be produced. The arrival of an additional Y producer
expands the range of services provided, conferring an externality on firms already in the region.
B. Autarky
Foreign.First consider autarky in Foreign. Suppose there are a large number of service firms,
each producing a single product. Given the service aggregate (3), I can apply the standard result
5that the price-elasticity of demand facing any individual firm is (l-a)' (Helpman and Krugrnan
1985). The profit-maximizing behavior of a representative service firm is to price according to
(7) p•, —
whereP is the price of service i. With free entry into services, profits will be driven to zero,
which implies




Symmetryimplies all service firms choose the same price and output levels.
Profit maximization in Y production implies
(ii) .-..— (1—O)z4(s?)
(12) —
Combining(7), (9), (10), and the above first-order conditions yields
310 (13) N-1-———.0_. -Z
Using (2) and the full-employment condition in Foreign, L +NL= L', I derive that
(14) ir — L.O(10)
(15) L, — L(1—O)
Due to increasing returns, N is increasing in the labor supply. As a goes to I (services become
more substitutable) N becomes small. From (14) and (15) it is trivial to solve for relative prices.
6Borne. Autarky in Home has three possible configurations of production: (i) regional autarky,
(ii) agglomeration of S and Y in one region, with Z divided between the regions, and (iii)
regional specialization, in which one region specializes in Z and the other in S and y.
Depending on parameter values, either (i) and (ii) or (i) and (iii) are both equilibria. Regional
autarky, however, is unlikely to be a stable equilibrium. Given external economies are localized,
Y producers want to be near S producers and vice-versa. If one region gains a slight advantage
in the number of service firms, it will atact all of the Y producers. For this reason, I focus on
agglomeration equilibria. Without loss of generality, I assume S is produced in South and Z is
divided between the two regions and then derive the conditions consistent with this outcome.
To make distance matter, I assume there are nansport costs between production stages.
Think of these costs as resulting from coordinating production in different locations. Transport
costs take an "iceberg form: of each unit of Z shipped between regions, a fraction 3<1arrives.
Service output in Home is the same as in Foreign, given in (9), and service prices are
again a fixed markup over cost, as in (7). The number of services produced is not necessarily







whichimplies that N and Z are related as in (13) and that
(19) V1— 1
WI
Nominalwages are lower in North due to ansport costs in delivering Z tothe industry center.
7Land rents work against agglomeration, ensuring production occurs in North. Assume the








Labor mobility requires that real wages are equalized across regions,
(23) — _________ papl-1
aF'
(24).!.—




Theformation of an industry center in South gives South a larger share of labor force than North.






8The condition that Z production occurs in South, the industry center, is that 1-8 >95a, which
is more likely to hold the larger the Z share in output and the higher transport costs.
Under autarky, the interaction of localization economies and transport costs creates a
regional production network: high-skill activities concentrate in an industry center, low-skill
activities disperse to low-wage regions. Agglomeration bids up the price of land in the center,
driving workers into the non-agglomerated region. Positive transport costs counteract migratory
pressures, as firms pay lower wages in regions distant from the industry center.
C. Trade
Consider trade between Home and Foreign where labor is immobile between countries.
To retain regional symmetry in Home, I assume there are iceberg transport costs of y on each
unit of Z shipped from North or South to Foreign.
Given L >L,we expect Foreign to be the low-cost producer of Y. This will be the case
if wIP,,theForeign relative price of Z and Y, exceeds w/(yP,), the Home relative price of Z
and Y, which, applying the autarky equilibrium solutions to (11) and (17), requires
I—1
'29' L> 6• +6
L6' +1
Asufficient condition for (29) to hold is that Foreign has a larger labor force than Home.
Autarky relative prices do not uniquely determine the trading equilibrium. External
economies imply one country will capture Y production. Even if Foreign is the larger country,
Home could become the industry center. If finns in both countries believe S and Y production
wifi concentrate in Home, no individual Foreign firm will have an incentive to enter either
9industry. Autarky relative prices, however, are likely to be a strong guide. If in adjusting to
trade firms respond to autarky relative prices, then in the equilibrium that obtains Home will
specialize in Z and Foreign will specialize in S and Y. It is this equilibrium I study.
If Foreign captures the entire Y market, all home labor is dedicated to Z production and
Foreign labor is divided between S and Z. Since the output of each service is given by (10), the
trading equilibrium can be summarized by solving for L, the amount of Foreign labor dedicated
to Z production, and N, the number of foreign service finns. Profit maximization implies





Traderecreates the regional production network on a global scale: Foreign becomes the global
industty center and subcontracts input production to Home. Equations (32) and (33) show that
w'= w, whichimplies L' == L/2or that trade causes a spatial redistribution of labor in
Home. Home specialization in Z means firms in South have no basis for paying high relative
wages; regional wage equalization in Home causes migration from South to North. Let the Home
wage be w.Equating(32) and (31), w/w= 1/y>I. If zproductionoccurs in both Home and
Foreign, nominal wages are equalized in the two countries, adjusting for transport costs.
The condition for factor-price equalization (FPE) is the same as that for Z production to
occur in Foreign. Equating (30) and (31) and using the fact that L + NL =C
10(34) u —0(1—c)(L • yL) a
(35)L, —L(1—0)
—OyL
The condition for FPE, then, is that LIC > (l-8)f&y,whichis more likely to hold the smaller is
Home relative to Foreign, the smaller is the share of Z in Y production, and the smaller are
transport costs (i.e., the larger is ).
Sincethe motivating example for the model is Mexico-U.S. trade, it may seem odd to
focus on the FPE case. Wages in the United States clearly exceed those in Mexico. Some
portion of the difference is surely due to productivity differences. If we think of L and Cas
efficiency units, FPE is the equalization of wages per efficiency unit. Still, massive Mexican
immigration into the United States is evidence wages per efficiency unit are not equalized in the
two countries. Appendix A considers the case where FPE does not obtain and there is migration
from Home to Foreign. The results are qualitatively the same as those with immobile labor.
[H. The Data
This section presents evidence on the organization and location of apparel production in
Mexico before and after trade liberalization. I employ data from the Mexico Industrial Census
and from 95 firm-level interviews I conducted in the Mexican apparel industry during 1990-1991
(appendix B describes interview methods and the sample of firms). Firm-levelinterviews are the
only urce of information on the internal organization of firms.Interview material suggest
patterns of industrial organization that in most cases canbe corroborated by Census data.'
Interview material are used lely to determine the nature of subcontracting activities. All datafor
estimation and summasy statistics are from the In4ust,id Census or another cited urce.
11The simple model presented above captures the essential features of apparel production
and trade in Mexico. Under the closed economy, high-skill apparel tasks concentrated in Mexico
City; low-skill tasks located in nearby communities. With the opening to trade, Mexico is
shifting from vertically-integrated production for the domestic market to product assembly for
foreign manufacturers. The shift involves industry relocation to the Mexico-U.S border region.
A. Trade Policy in Mexico
Mexico began to construct a trade regime based on import substitution in the 1940's.
Trade restrictions took the form of import licenses, tariffs, and export controls (King 1970). In
1985, Mexico reversed its inward-oriented policy and began to liberalize trade. Between July
1985 and December 1987, import-license requirements fell from 92.2 percent of national
production to 23.2 percent. and the production-weighted-average tariff fell from 27 percent to
11.0 percent. with a 20 percent maximum. In apparel, the weighted-average tariff fell from 49.8
percent to 20 percent and import licenses fell from 100.0 percent to zero (Hanson 1994).
Trade liberalization was not the apparel industry's first exposure to world markets. In the
1960's, the govermnent began to allow off-shore assembly in free-trade zones along the Mexico-
U.S. border (Grunwald and Flamm 1985). Off-shore assembly is one component of regional
production networks. A foreign firm, typically from the United States, establishes an assembly
plant. known as a maquiladora,inMexico. The maquiladora imports all inputs from the foreign
firm, assembles the inputs in Mexico, and exports the final product back to the foreign firm.2
Off-shore assembly plants are exempt from import duties as long as they export all output
Item 807 of the u.S. tariff schedule allows finns that engage in off-shore assemb'yof U.S.manufactured
components to only pay import duties on the value-added abroad.
12Figure 1 shows the value of imports and exports for domestic and off-shore apparel
industries from 1982 to 1990 (Secretariat of Trade and Industrial Promotion, unpublished data).
Trade has increased dramatically since liberalization. The United States is Mexico's major
trading partner in apparel. In 1990, 66.2 percent of non-maquiladora apparel exports went to the
United States, and 52.9 percent of Mexican apparel imports caine from the United States.4
B. The Vertical Organization of Apparel Production
Apparel production is organized around assembly subcontracting. Manufacturers control
product design, finishing, and marketing, and divide assembly between their own shops and
independent subcontractors. Under the closed economy, most domestic apparel manufacturers
located in Mexico City and subcontracted assembly to shops in nearby communities. The Mexico
Industrial Censusprovidesindirect evidence of subcontracting. Table 1 reports the size
distribution of apparel establishments in 1980. At one end of the distribution are a small number
of large establishments —themanufacturers: 250 shops, about 2 percent of establishments, with
100 or more workers accounted for 43.0 percent of total apparel employment. At the other end
of the distribution are a large number of small establishments --thesubcontractors 9,233 shops,
about 75 percent of establishments, employed five or fewer workers.5
Domestic manufacturers were not the only source of assembly subcontracting in the closed
economy. Through maquiladoras, foreign manufacturers also subcontracted assemblyactivities
Value added in off-shore apparel exports is off-shore exports less imported inputs.
VIrtually all maquiladora exports go the United States. Mexico remains a suall player in theU.S. market.
In 1987. only 23 percent of US. imports of apparel and finished textile products (SIC 23) came fromMexico.
'Establishmentswithout paid labor include the self-employed and shops that hire only family labor.
13to Mexican firms. Despite the similarities in domestic and off-shore subcontracting, the two
industries remain entirely separate. Apparel mauiladoras have virtualiy no linkages with
domestic industry. Foreign firms provide all inputs, including fabric, and the maquiladoras, as
the law stipulates, export virtually all of their output.'













Establishments w/o Paid Labor 7,047 10,515 0.5780.073
Establishments w/ Paid Labor 5,152 133,831 0.4220.927
Paid 1 to 5 2,186 6,188 0.1790.043
Workers 6 to 25 1,842 22,468 0.1510.156
per 26 to 100 874 43,185 0.0720.299
Estab. 101 + 250 61,990 0.0210.430
Total 12,199 144,346 — --
Source: XI CensoIndustrial,1981.
C. The Geography ofPmductlonandWagesintheClosed Economy
Figure2 shows the location of apparel and overall manufacturing employment in Mexico
from 1970 to 1988 (CensoIndustrial, variousyears). In 1970, 55.4 percent of national apparel
employment was located in the Federal District, the federal entity which contains Mexico City.
In the 1970's manufacturers began to leave the capital; the share of apparel employment located
in the Federal District declined to 33.2 percent in 1985. During the same period, the share of
apparel jobs located in central states, which neighbor the capital, increased from 13.5 percent to
Between 1981 and1988,domestic inputs accounted for an average of 0.25percentof inputs consumed by
apparelmaquiIadora on the Mexico-U.S. border (INEGI, 1989a).
1424.3 percent, and the share in north-central states increased from 12.5 percent to 21.6 percent.7
Interview material suggest the activities that left the capital were those related to assembly, and
that design, finishing, and marketing remained concentrated in Mexico City;' in 1980, 69.8
percent of wholesale trade in apparel and textiles was still conducted in the Federal District
The relocation of apparel production followed the emergence of wage differentials
between Mexico City and outlying states. Figure 3 shows the ratio of average nominal regional
wages to average nominal national wages in apparel and all manufacturing from 1970 to 1988
(CensoIndustrial, variousyears).' In 1970, average apparel wages in the Federal District ranged
from 1.11 times those in central states to 2.97 times those in southern states. Apparel jobs did
not move to regions with the lowest relative wages, but to regions nearest the capital.
D. Industrial Organization and Trade Liberalization
Since the opening to trade in 1985, there has been a substantial relocation of Mexican
apparel production. Figure 2 shows that between 1980 and 1988 the share of apparel
employment in border states increased from 15.0 percent to 21.8 percent, while the share of
apparel employment in the Federal District and Central states declined. There has also been a
shift from domestic production towards off-shore apparel assembly. Table 2 shows total
Central states adjoin the Federal District (Hidalgo. Mexico, Morelos,Puebla,Thxcala. Veracrnz); North-
Central states are non-border gate, north of the capital (Aguascalientes. Baja California Sur, Durango.
Guanajuato. Jalisco, Nayarft, Quer&ero. San Lals Potosf, Sinalos, Zacatecas); border states idjoin theU.S. (Baja
California. Coahuila, Chihuahua. Nuevo Lcdn, Sonora. Tamaulipas); and South states are those ruth of the
capital (Campeche, Colinia, Chiapas, Guerrero. Mlchoaodn.. Oaxaca. Quintana Roo. Tabasco.Yucathi).
Five of the six apparel-producing regions I visited were founded by manufacturers who had relocatedtheir
assembly operations from Mexico City.
'Theaverage wage is calculated as total remuneration per worker.
15employment in apparel, employment in off-shore apparel assembly (assembly for foreign firms),
and a breakdown of off-shore assembly between border and interior states. Between 1981 and
1988, the share of national apparel employment in off-shore assembly increased from 12.9 percent
to 20.0 percent Most job growth in off-shore assembly has taken place in interior Mexico, as
firms that used to produce for the domestic market have shifted to assembly for foreign firms.
Table 2: Apparel Employment In Mexico, 1981-1989
Total Off-Shore Border AssemblyInterior Assembly
Year Employment AssemblyLevel (%) Level (%)
1981 143,986 18,059 14,278 (79.1)3,781 (20.9)
1982 — 15,002 11,891 (793) 3,111 (20.7)
1983 -- 16,212 12,885 (79.5)3,327 (20.5)
1984 19,888 15,161 (76.2)4,727 (23.8)
1985 146,809 21,473 15,089 (703) 6,384 (29.7)
1986 — 25,311 16,883 (66.7)8,428 (333)
1987 — 30,273 19,399 (64.1) 10,874 (35.9)
1988 173,263 34,707 20,289 (58.5) 14,418 (41.5)
1989 -- 42,400 — —
Totalapparel employment includes the domestic and off-shore industries (figures for
which are only available for census years). Source: Censo Industrial, various years;
INEGI, La Industria Maquiladora de Exporración, various issues.
Figure 4 shows quarterly employment indices for domestic apparel production, off-shore
apparel assembly, and all manufacturing (Bank of Mexico, unpublished data). Between 1987 and
1990, employment in the domestic apparel industry (firms that are not maquiladoras) increased
by only 0.16 percent, while employment in off-shore apparel assembly increased by 39.5 percent
Figure 1 shows off-shore assembly exports have boomed since liberalization, increasing from USS
300.0 million in 1987 to USS 496.3 million in 1989. By contrast, domestic apparel exports rose
from USS 52.7 million in 1987 to USS 683 million in 1989.
16Some observers attribute the tremendous export success of off-shore apparel assembly
relative to the domestic apparel industry to trade barriers in the United States. Before NAFTA,
the United States maintained quotas on Mexican apparel exports under the Multi-Fiber
Arrangement. Mexico-U.S. trade agreements did give maquiladora exports first access to quotas,
but quotas were binding in only a few product categories. Between 1988 and 1990, average
quota utilization rates were over 60 percent in four product categories out of 61: overalls
(112.9%). pants (102.1%). pajamas (88.6%), and shirts and blouses (80.9%).b0
NAFTA will further integrate Mexico into the U.S. economy by eliminating apparel
quotas in the U.S. and tariffs on both sides of the border. Adjustment to trade liberalization
provides a preview of the changes to come. For Mexico, NAFTA implies the continued
conversion to apparel assembly and the continued relocation of production activities to the north.
The further reduction of trade barriers is only likely to reinforce the emerging structure of
production and bilateral trade flows, holding constant changes in other industries.
IV. Empirical Results
The model predicts that under the closed economy regional wages are decreasing in
transport costs to the industry center in Mexico City. Full estimation of the model is complicated
by interactions between apparel and other activities and by the role of agriculture in labor supply.
I estimate the regional wage structure as given by equation (19), which in general form is
W/W=
wherew. is the apparel wage in region i, w is the apparel wage in the industry center,and S, is
°Thepre-NAPTA bilateral trade agreement allowed Mexico to obtain quota increases for most goods on
request (ConvenloBilojerojMexico-Estados Unidos 1988).
17unit transport costs between region I and the industry center. In the open economy, this structure
breaks down and regional relative wages are instead determined by access to foreign markets.
I assume transport costs are an increasing function of distance, d. The regression equation is
log(w,/w,) = + 13,,log(dj+
wheretspecifiesthe year and ja is an error term whose structure I discuss below. Let T be the
unanticipated date of trade liberalization. Theory predicts
for:<T,
ft=o
Theexistence of free-trade zones along the Mexico-U.S. border in effect liberalized trade for the
border before the rest of the country. This provides an additional testable hypothesis: given the
access of border apparel producers to foreign industry centers, border apparel wages should be
unrelated to distance from Mexico City. I test this hypothesis by allowing distance effects for
border states to differ from those for interior states that is, I expect j3, =0for border states.
Table 3 lists variable means and standard deviations. Wages are constructed from the
Mexico Industrial Census. Mexico contains 32 states, including the Federal District The wage
variable I use, w, is average aimual remuneration per employee in the apparel industry of state
i in year r." A variety of factors generate regional wage differentials. To isolate regional wage
differentials that are specific to the apparel industry, I divide wdw,. by the ratio of the average
manufacturing wage in state Ito the national average manufacturing wage.'2 Complete state data
are available for five years, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1988, providing 155 observations (5
I divide wbythe average national apparelwage, w, ratherthan by the Mexico City wage, to omit
variation in the capital wage that is unrelated to the apparel industry.
'3
Regressionresults with !og(w,iw,.) as the dependent variable, rather than !ag(wdw,,)adjustedby the
relative state manufacturing wage, arc similar to those given below.
18years x 31 states —omittingthe Federal District), of which four sets (1970-1985) correspond to
the closed economy and one set (1988) corresponds to the open economy. To compensate for
variation in transportation infrastructure across states, I measure distance as average hours
required to travel by first-class passenger bus between the capital of state i and Mexico City.'3
A. Econometric Issues
I have observations on relative apparel wages across states and across time. To control
for idiosyncratic components in the error tenn, I assume j.thasthe following form:
lt =+ + 'Tlk
where ü,isthe effect for state i, u, is the effect for year:, and TL is an ii.d. random variable with
mean zero and variance c?. If state and year effects are random, I can use OLS for estimation.
Dwivedi and Srivastava (1978) show that in panel regression if the independent variables do not
vary across groups of observations OLS is identical to GLS. In my case, the distance variables
do not vary across time. This means in a regression of relative wages on log distance the OLS
estimates of the f3's are efficient even if the s are correlated across states or years.
If state and year effects are fixed instead of random the solution is not so simple. First-
differencing the data eliminates the distance variable; using state dummy variables to control for
fixed state effects introduces perfect rnulticollinearity. I first estimate the regression with and
without year dummies. The distance variable, in addition to capturing transport costs, will pick
up any other state effects that are correlated with distance to Mexico City. To determine what
portion of fixed state effects are related to distance, I perform a second regression in which I
"Bushours are from B.Box Cd., Sou:hAmerzcan !fw,dbook 1990. New York: Prentice-Hall, (1990).
19replace distance with state dummies. The estimated state effects represent the mean effect of
state characteristics on relative wages, controlling for the year. There are surely state
characteristics besides distance that matter for wages,replacing distance with state dummies
will likely increase the explanatory power of the regression. To determine how much, I regress
the estimated state dummies on distance. The variance in the estimated state effects that distance
explains indicates the relative importance of distance among other state characteristics.
B. Results
Table 4 gives estimation results on regional relative apparel wages for 155 observations
from 1970,1975,1980, 1985, and 1988. The (a) columns include year dummies; the (b) columns
do not. I interact log distance with 3RD,adummy variable that takes a value of one if the state
is a border state and with yr88,adummy variable that takes a value of one if the year is 1988.
The results show strong support for the hypothesis that regional relative apparel wages
decrease with distance from Mexico City. In all regressions log distance to Mexico City, log(dj,
is negative and significant at the .01 level. Moreover, the quantitative effect of distance is large.
From.the results in column (3b), a one standard deviation increase in log distance (0.966) reduces
log state relative apparel wages by 0339, which is nearly half a standard deviation (0.722). 1 do
not find, however, that trade liberalization eliminates the distance effect.In two of four
regressions, I reject the null hypothesis that log(d) is zero in 1988 at the .01 level.'4
There is other evidence trade matters for wages. In all regressions I fail to reject the null
This hypothesis is equivalent to the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients on log(dJand
log(dJyr88 is zero, which is the version I test. A weaker test is that the distance effect falls in 1988. In all
regressions I fail to reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on log(dJ is constant across years at the .05 level.
20hypothesis that tog(d)iszero for border states at the .05 leve1. This is consistent with the
hypothesis that border producers' access to foreign markets reduced the importance of distance
from the domestic industry center in Mexico City. It may not seem surprising that wages on the
Mexico-U.S. border are high relative to other regions. Recall, however, that my measure of
relative wages controls for regional wage differentials at the state manufacturing level. Even
controlling for overall wage differentials, then, apparel wages along the border are relatively high.
Table 5 shows results from regressing log relative wages on state and year dummies.
Estimated state effects for four of the six border states are positive; three are significant at the
.05 level. The only other positive state effect is that for the state of Mexico, which borders
Mexico City. This is cOnsistent with the findings from Table 4, that relative wages are high
along the border. Comparing Table 5 with column (3b) in Table 4 shows that replacing distance
variables with state dummies increases the adjusted R2 from 349to.793. Distance appears to
account for about two-fifths of the explained variance in regional relative apparel wages that is
attributable to state characteristics. To verify this is the case, I regress the estimated state effects
on the distance variables, again controlling for border states. The resulting regression is
——.0919—.3i11s1og(d)+.3939S1og(d1)*BRDN—30, W..414
(.2138) (.1269) (.0726)
where standard errors are in parentheses and of' is the estimated state effect for state 1. Distance
accounts for 41.4 percent of the variance in regional relative wages that is attributable to state
characteristics. While other state-specific factors affect regional relative wages, distance is a
relatively important among these characteristics. To ensure border states are not driving the
The hypothesis I test is that the sum of the coefficients on log(dJandtog(dJBRDiszero.
21results, I regress states effects for non-border states on distance:
•—.0902 —.3118s1og(d1)W24,=.193
(.21.38)(.1.299)
where nbindicatesnon-borderstates.The coefficientestimates are consistent with thoseabove,
but the explained varianceislower.
I proceed to check the robustness of the resultsinTable 4. It is likely that improvements
in roads, bridges, andtransport equipmentsubstantiallyreduced travel time between 1970 and
1988.Thiswouldaffect the coefficientestimatesif improvements in transportationwere
correlated withdistance from Mexico City. To control for changes in the relationship between
distance and transport costs, I allow distance effects to vary over time. Table 6 shows results
where I interact log distance with dummy variables for border states and for year. The base
category is interior states in 1970. I find no evidence that distance effects vary over time.In
all regressions I fail to reject the hypothesis that the distance variables interacted with year
dummies are different from zero at the .05level.Another possibility is that the distance effects
are driven by the inclusion of border states in the regression. To verify this is not the case, I
drop border states from the regression. Table 7 reports the results. Without border states, log
distance from Mexico City remains negative and significant at the .01 level in all regressions.
The strength of the results is that even controlling for overall manufacturing wage
differentials relative apparel wages are lower for states that are distant from the capital. While
the results on border states are consistent with the hypothesis that trade liberalization has altered
the closed-economy apparel wage structure, this does not imply that the open-economy wage
structure will exhibit less disparity. Border states currently have relatively high wages andthe
continuingrelocation of apparel jobs to the north —whichis only likely to continue under
22NAFTA --suggeststhat regional wage differentials will also be a feature of the open economy.
V. Concluding Remarks
This paper develops a model of regional subcontracting based on location-specific external
economies. Localization economies arise endogenously from the provision of specialized inputs.
Congestion costs due to agglomeration push low-skill activities into outlying regions. I apply the
model to a study of the effects of trade liberalization on the Mexican apparel industry.
Consistent with the model, apparel production in the closed economy was geographically
concentrated. With the opening of the economy, the domestic apparel industry is converting to
product assembly for foreign clients. Concurrently, producers are relocating their activities to the
Mexico-U.S. border region. Estimation results on regional apparel wages are consistent with the
existence of localization economies.
For a developing economy, trade liberalization involves a transition from vertically-
integrated manufacturing to a specialized role of subcontracting for developed-country firms. In
apparel, and other labor-intensive industries, this transition implies the conversion to off-shore
assembly and possibly profound changes in the spatial location of production. Sectoral-level
analyses miss these changes by focusing on resource movements across industries while ignoring
the organizational and locational changes that occur within industries. This has been the case in
most if not all of the economy-wide models developed to study NAFTA (e.g., USITC 1992). The
effects of NAFTA on the pattern of regional specialization in Mexico are likely to be at least as
profound as those on the pattern of industrial specialization.
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25</ref_section>Appendix A: International Trade with MobileLabor
Suppose now labor is mobile between countries.Since my focus is the long-run trade
equilibrium, I ignore migration costs and assume labor mobility is perfect. Home labor in
Foreign, then, earns the same wage as Foreign labor. Let L' be the number of workers that
migrate from Home to Foreign. In addition to the profit-maximization conditions in (30)-(33),
we have the condition that real wages are equalized between Home and Foreign. Following (22)
Cal) v(L-L)-w(L+L')
P.x
Let p =X/X,where I assume p >1. If Z production occurs in both regions, it still holds that
wIw= iIy. Following(24), real-wage equalization in Home and Foreign implies PJP, =
(j/.Ø!tQ Puttingthese results together with (a!)
(&2) Lr_ pL—y'L
p'r
Thecondition for positive migration is p > whichrequires Foreign have sufficient land
relative to Home that migration from Home to Foreign does not violate the land-rent differential
imposed by transport costs. From (a2) and the conditions imposed by profit maximization,
(3)N• — pL(1') +L(p T)0(1_0)
• y)
From .(a3) it is straightforward to derive total employment in services, total employment in Z, and
the remaining relative prices. The basic results do not change from the trading equilibrium with
immobile labor. In the small country (Home), trade again causes wage compression and spatial
decentralization; in the trading equilibrium, we again have the formation of a regional production
network, with the industry center in the large country and input production in the small country.
26Appendix B: DatafromFirm-level Interviews
The data are from 95firm-levelinterviews conducted with apparel manufacturers and
subcontractors in seven Mexican cities between September, 1990, and May, 1991. Interviews
were ananged through five organizations: the National Apparel Industry Chamber (78), Dynamic
Consultants to Micro-Enterprises (6) the September 19th Apparel Workers Union (5),theNational
Autonomous University of Mexico (2), and the Authentic Labor Front (2). Interviews followed
a general questionnaire and ranged from one to four hours. The questionnaire and interview
transcripts are available on request. The following lists interviews by location and activity:
Mexico City (52) Number Number
Apparel Industry Chamber 5 Unions 4
Fashion and Design Center 2 Women's Outerwear 8
Men's Outerwear 9 Knitwear 5
GeneralSubcontracting 3 Retailer'Traders 11
Other 5
Monterrey. Nuevo LeOn (13) Guadalajara. Jalisco(10)
Women's Outerwear 6 Women's Outerwear 6
Pants 2 Other 4
Shirts 2
Othe; 3
Aguascalientes. Ms (9) Tehuacn. Puebla (7)
Children's Outerwear S Pants 4
Linens 2 Shirts 3
Other. 2
NezahuacOyotl. Mex (2) Almoloya del RIo. Mex (2)
Subcontracting 2 Subcontracting 2
27Table 3: Variable Means and Standard Deviations
Mean Std. Dev.
JObs.No.
Distance (hrs) 14.25 14.12
J 31
State Apparel Wage! National Apparel Wage
1970 0.516 0.281 31
1975 0.602 0.435 31
1980 0.566 0.317 31
1985 0.662 0.383 31
1988 0.688 0386 31
1970-1988 0.607 0365 155
(State Apparel Wage/National Apparel Wage)!
(State Manufacturing Wage/National Manufacturing Wage)
1970 0.723 0.232 31
1975 0.764 0.409 31
1980 0.681 0.424 31
J5 0.861 0.643 31
1988 0.923 0.572 31
1970-1988 0.790 0.490 155
• Values are for all statesexcepttheFederal District, the federal entity that contains Mexico City.
28Table 4: Regression of State Relative Wages on Distance from Mexico City
(heteroskedasticity-consistentstandard errors in parentheses)

















































Adj. R2 0349 0.351 0359 0.351 0356 0349



































year dummies no yes no yes no yes
* ()Indicates significance at the .05 (.01) level. BRD is a dummy variable that indicates
border states. yrS8 is a dummy variable that indicates the year is 1988.
29Table 5: Fixed-Effects Estimation
Variable Coeff. St. Err.Variable Coeff. St. Err.
constant -0.4550.071 Oaxaca -1.651'0.116
Baja California5 0.273 0.091 Puebla -0.206 0.067
Baja Calif. Sur -0.4340.209 Quintana Roo -O.916 0.203
Chihuahua5 0181 0.064Quertero -0.034 0.176
Chiapas -2.0960.133 Sinaloa -0.798 0.068
Campeche -1.4830.238 San Lufs Potosf -0.281 0.068
Coahuila3 -0.0060.092 Sonora3 0.176 0.105
Colima -1.8560.233 Tabasco -1394'0.094
Durango -0.152 0.108 Tamaulipa? -0.0130.062
Cuerrero -0386 0.140 Tlaxcala -03170.116
Guanajuato -0.2620.079 Veracruz -13120.079
Hidalgo -03820.095 Yucatan -0.431'0.100
Jalisco -0.0440.066 Zacatecas -0.8170.236
Michoacan -0.8450.095 yr75 0.1100.076
Mdxico O.1920.088 yr8O 0.011 0.067
Mo.r Ins -0.4660.343 yr85 0.1850.067
Nayarft -1.060 0.133 yr88 0.2590.060
Nuevo Leon3 0.259 0.091 Adj. R2 =0.793 Obs. No. =155
() Indicatessignificance at the .05 (.01) level.Indicates border state. (Omitted state is
Aguascalientes omitted year is 1970.)
30Table 6: RegressIon Results withTime-VaryingCoefficients
(heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses)









































































Adj. R2 0349 0349 0.333 0335































year dummies no yes no yes
yrXX is a dummy variable that indicates the year is 19X.X; other definitions as in Table 4.
31Table 7: Regression Results Excluding Border States
(heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses)

































Adj. R2 0.169 0.166 0.164 0.162













year dummies no yes no yes
Note. ')efinitions from Tables 4 and 6 apply.
32Figure 1:Mexico Foreign 4pparel Trade, 1982—1990
o Domestic Apparel Exports
Domestic Apparel Imports
a Off-Shore Apparel Exports
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